26 August 2024

about the unid 32-bit protocol used in S-4538 + MS-110A transfers

This is the third time I have encountered these transmissions [1] and, given the good number of recordings made over a few days on the frequency 6964.5 KHz/USB, it is now possible to draw a more definitive "picture".

Transmissions normally occur each 5 minutes and last 1.5 - 2 minutes average. STANAG-4538 (3G-HF) "circuit mode service" is used, where MS-110A (usually in 75bps/Long Interleaver mode) is the used traffic waveform; sometimes a transmission may consist of two or more distinct data transfer sessions (Figure 1).

Links are established using the FLSU (Fast Link SetUp) Asynchronous scanning call, using BW5 and an "optimized" waveform which provides no repetition of the initial TLC section (used for transmitter level control and receiver AGC settling). Such a scanning call is exactly described in paragraph C.5.2.4.5.2 of  MIL 188-141B Appendix C: "The LE_Scanning_Call PDU shall be sent repeatedly to capture scanning receivers [...] During a scanning call, only the first LE_Scanning_Call PDU shall include TLC. All succeeding LE_Scanning_Call PDUs and the LE_Call PDU shall omit TLC, and include only the BW0 preamble and data portions" (1)(2). So, we look at a STANAG-4538 FLSU Async call (since the use of BW5 waveform) which is 188-141B compliant for what regards its formation (since the omission of  the TLC sections): ie, a sort of  188-141B/STANAG-4538 mixed implementation most likely implemented by L3Harris [2][3]. That "formation" of the Async call clarifies why decoders recognize only the "first" BW5 PDU. 

Fig. 1

Looking at the asynchronous scan calls, at first glance it seems that Linking Protection (LP) is not used: in fact, as you can see, the decoded strings are identical. This should not happen since when operating in encrypt mode, the LP algorithm takes as inputs the PDU to be scrambled, a key variable, and a “seed” that contains Time of Day (TOD) and the frequency that carries the protected transmission.

2024-08-21T09_54_32Z BW-5 00111001010000100011011001001010011110001000011010
2024-08-21T09_56_17Z BW-5 00111001010000100011011001001010011110001000011010
2024-08-21T10_01_54Z BW-5 00111001010000100011011001001010011110001000011010

2024-08-22T07_46_52Z BW-5 00010110100000110011111110111010101110111100000110
2024-08-22T07_51_52Z BW-5 00010110100000110011111110111010101110111100000110

Anyway, it's to note that when the protection against spoofing offered by LP is not required, LP may be used without a key variable or seed to provide only scrambling based on the network number as described in STANAG-4538 4.1.2 (in this regard, note that the scanning calls of 2024-08-22, for example, do not have the expected value "001" in the first three bits). 

The analysis of the MS-110A decoded bitstreams show initial 100 bytes length headers which have some parts common to all the bitstreams, the header "format" is more evident after the removal of the initial "10"s sequence (Figures 2,3).

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

In my opinion, headers are made up of the following structure (Figure 4):

1) common initial sequence

1100000100011100101001 (maybe 001100000100011100101001, 0x0CE294)

2) common 193 bits length "01"s sequence, (phasing?). Boundaries are marked by two consecutive logical "1"

3) common 160 bits / 20 bytes length sequence (sync sequence for the receive crypto device?)

10001011010001111000010010000111
01111011101101001011100010000111
01000100011110000100100001110111
10111011010010111000101101110100
01000111100001001000011101111011

4) 256 bits / 32 bytes length sequence which is different in every bitstream (Initialization Vector?)

5) common 5×32 bits / 4 bytes repeated sequence (frame sync?). Note that the sequence can't be an Initialization Vector since it's always the same in every bitstream.

10001011010001111000010010000111
10001011010001111000010010000111
10001011010001111000010010000111
10001011010001111000010010000111
10001011010001111000010010000111


Also note that the 4 bytes repeated sequence is used in the first 4 bytes of the 160 bits sequence.

Fig. 4 - the common blocks in the headers of the bitstreams

According to the results of the "Shannon Entropy" and "Statistical" tests, the ansferred data are most probably encrypted (Figure 5).
The measure of the Shannon Entropy can be used, in a broad sense, to detect whether data is likely to be structured or unstructured. 8 is the maximum, representing highly unstructured, 'random' data. Properly encrypted or compressed data should have an entropy of over 7.5 The statistical test below determines the randomness, the number of single bits in the stream is counted, then the double bits, then the triple bits and so on to the end. The result is a graph: if the information is not systematic, the adjacent columns should be half the size of the previous ones. Both the test shows good encryption quality.

Fig. 5 - Shannon Entropy and Statistical tests on the data portions

The transmissions are fairly receivable only in the northern regions of Europe, likely a low power transmitter is used or a local/domestic area shall be served. Just about the site of the transmitter,  all my direction finding attempts point to a quite large area in Norway (Figure 6): maybe a Royal Norwegian Navy Tx? Anyway, it's to notice that the DF results "suffer" from the lack of detection points west of Norway.

Fig. 6 - Direction finding attempts (TDoA algorithm)

Monitoring & recordings thanks to the remote KiwiSDRs SM0KOT (Sweden) and OZ1AEF (Denmark) [4][5]. 

https://disk.yandex.com/d/AcwncUTKxXlQ_A (decoded bitstreams)

(1) MIL 188-141B refers to BW0 as the waveform to convey "LE_Scanning_Call PDU" and "LE_Call PDU" (LE stands for Link Establishment): FLSU, and consequently the BW5 waveform, were not yet defined at that time.

(2) 188-141B (released on March 1999!) was superseded by 188-141C (December 2011), in its turn superseded by 188-141D (December 2017): the last two standards no longer have the Appendix C but only some short paragraphs, among them the #C.6 says "The specifications previously contained in this appendix have been replaced with reference to the essentially identical NATO STANAG 4538".

[1] http://i56578-swl.blogspot.com/search/label/P%3D32
[2] http://i56578-swl.blogspot.com/2022/10/harris-3g-ale-flsu-async-call.html
[3] http://i56578-swl.blogspot.com/2022/10/harris-3g-ale-flsu-async-call-2.html
[4] http://aspliden.kostet.se:8074/
[5] http://85.191.35.22:8073/

 

31 July 2024

unid FSK 300Bd/300 bursts

Interesting and unidentified FSK 300Bd/300 bursts heard on ~14490 KHz and sent to me by my friends ANgazu and cryptomaster (Figure 1).

Fig. 1 - FSK 300Bd/300 bursts

The signals recorded by the latter (6 bursts) have a better SNR and therefore more suitable to be analyzed. As you can see in Figure 2, the demodulated bitstreams (d1-d6) can be divided into the 4 groups G1, G2, G3, and G4:

Fig. 2 - couples of demodulated bitstreams d1-d2, d3-d4, d5-d6
 

G1: (40 bits) probably a header/SOM sequence, this group is common to all the bitstreams;

G2: (40 bits) this group is different in every bitstream and maybe consists of something related to the message. In a 10-bit format it's possible to see repeated "fields", when reshaped to a 20-bit format the groups may consist of a 11-bit "field" followed by a common 9-bit pattern (Figure 3);

Fig. 3 - G2 groups

G3: (variable length)  I think this group is the data part of the message, this is sent twice into two different bursts (sometimes 3 times in 3 bursts). These groups have a period of 50 bits in length that appears to have some form of structure (Figure 4);

Fig. 4 - G3 groups

G4: (20 bits) probably the EOM sequence, this group is common to all the bitstreams.

During the formation of this FSK signal the phases of the two frequencies are preserved after each "shift" (Figure 5), ie the frequency shift is generated by a single generator and its clock frequency changes, so the manipulation is achieved without disrupting the phase of the signal. If two frequency generators are used then we should see changes of phase in both f1 and f2, unless the two generators are in some way phase synchronized.

f2 ~ 1976,98 HZ (2:0,001011640)
f1 ~ 1676,95 Hz (2:0,001192640)

as expecetd, 300 Hz shift (f2 - f1).

Fig. 5 - phases of the two frequencies

The prevailing opinion is that this is probably some type of selcall or ALE probing, in which case the G2 groups could be the addresses.

https://disk.yandex.com/d/3gK_L2RqFjHXXQ



19 July 2024

CIS-1200 SDPSK 1200Bd ("Makhovik", T-230-1A)

updated (23 July 2024)

This transmission, along with a probably spurius emission 600 Hz above, was recorded on 13002.5 KHz (cf) thanks to the remote KiwiSDR located in Azumino-city Nagano, Japan [1].

Fig. 1 - main signal and its spurius

The signal that I assume is the "actual" one and that I analyzed is characterized by a SDPSK (Simmetrical Differential PSK) modulation at a speed of 1200 Baud. Indeed SDPSK is equivalent to π/2 DBPSK or PSK2 with phase rotation: ie, as shown by the transitions in absolute mode, SDPSK assumes that the phase is rotated by +π/2 for bit “0” and by -π/2 for bit “1” thus there is not a 180° turn (transitions do not pass through 0). The information transmitted is encoded in the transition and not in the state. The signal can be demodulated using the differential mode (diff=1).

Fig. 2 - SDPSK modulation

The transmission consists of some segments that differ by the presence or absence of an initial preamble (signals A and B in Figure 3) which consists of a repeated 511-bit length pseudo-random sequence generated by the polynomial x^9+x^5+1 (1) as for the ITU Recommendation O.153 [2] (188-110B "39-tone parallel mode" too uses that sequences).

Fig. 3
 
Fig. 4 - 511 bits length sequence

The presence of such sequences is one of the features of the so-called Makhovik (aka the "flywheel"), a well known Soviet-Mil crypto system. Although someone classifies Makhovik as vocoder, it can can be used for time-multiplexed encryption of both voice and data up to 9600 bps. It's official name is "T-230 bundle ciphering device for teleprinter and  data connections" and was designed to operate in UHF but very often is found in LF and in HF.
After the removal of the initial preamble, the following data block consists of a "common" sequence:

110101100100011110101100100011

followed by 240-bit Initialization Vectors that are sent in 8x30-bit groups, each group repeted three times (Figure 5): these 30-bit groups are another peculiar feature of  the Makhovik system.

010000111011001110010100001110
011101100101000011001010000111
110010100001110010000111011001
001110110010100000111011001010
001110110010100011001010000111
111111111111111000011101100101
001110110010100111011001010000
101100101000011011101100101000

Fig. 5

Segments sent w/out the initial preamble (type B in Figure 3) show exactly the same structure: note as the Initialization Vectors slightly differ (Figure 6): this feature should be further studied (it is probably somehow related to the presence/absence of the initial preamble) but it is necessary to obtain several more recordings.

010000111011001110010100001110
011101100101000011001010000111

110010100001110010000111011001
001110110010100000111011001010
001110110010100011001010000111
111111111111111000011101100101
001110110010100111011001010000
101100101000011011101100101000

010000111011001110010100001110
011101100101000011001010000111

011001010000111100001110110010
111011001010000110010100001110
010100001110110110110010100001
100101000011101001010000111011
111011001010000111111111111111
011101100101000100001110110010

Fig. 6

It's worth noting that in some previous Makhovik recordings I saw differential encoded data & BPSK, while this ones consist of  plain encoded data & SDPSK [3].

update (23 July 2024)
I willingly add a comment sent me by my friend cryptomaster.
The common sequence in Figs 5,6

110101100100011110101100100011

shall be right shifted to appear as

111101011001000111101011001000

which in turn is the repetition of the 15 bits length M-sequence generated by the polynomial x^4+x+1 (Figure 7).

111101011001000

Fig. 7 - the repetition of the 15 bits M-sequence generated by the polynomial x^4+x+1

https://disk.yandex.com/d/Vg5XruORhd8_5A

(1) the use of the polynomial x^9+x^5+1 is quite common in CIS waveforms,see http://i56578-swl.blogspot.com/p/polynomials.html

[1] http://jf0fumkiwi.ddns.net:8073/
[2] https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-O.153/en
[3] https://i56578-swl.blogspot.com/search/label/Makhovik 

16 July 2024

MS-110D App.D (WBHF) transmissions, Collins Aerospace over-the-air testing? (2)

Yet another MS-110D sample [1] transmitted from Oxford Junction (IA) site, recorded on 19825.7 KHz/USB and sent me by my friend linkz: this signal too is PSK8 modulated at the symbol rate of 2400 Bd but occupies a 3 KHz bandwidth (Figure 1).

Fig. 1 - waveform main parameters
 
The ACF results  shown in Figure 2 formally show the same characteristics, that is, a sort of "superframe" lasting 840 ms (corresponding to 2016 PSK8 symbols, or 6048 bits) comprising seven frames each lasting 120 ms (corresponding to 288 PSK8 symbols, or 864 bits).
 
Fig. 2 - results from the Auto Correlation Function
 
Bandwidth, modulation and framing match the Waveform Number 7 described in MIL-STD 110D Appendix D (WBHF, WideBandHF)
 

The demodulated bitstreams conform to the bitmaps in Figure 2: in particular, the sequences circled in in Figs. 2, 3 are special mini-probes used to mark the interleaver boundaries. In this case they are transmitted every 64 frames, corresponding to the use of the "long interleaver" mode.
 
Fig. 3 - 864 bits (266+32 PSK8 symbols) period demodulated bitstream

Just to verify compliance with the MS-110D standard, the mini-probes are made up of a repeated sequence of 16 symbols while the miniprobes used to mark the boundaries of the interleaver block are shifted by 8 steps (Figure 4).
 
Fig. 4 - the generic mini-probe and the interleaver marker mini-probe

As expected, the 840 ms spikes resulting from  ACF are due to the cyclic nature of the transmitted data: that is, the same block of data consisting of 7 frames (Figure 5).
 
Fig. 5 - data blocks after the removal of mini-probes

As stated at the beginning, Direction Finding (TDoA algorithm) tests done by my friend linkz indicate Oxford-Junction as the site of the transmitting antenna (Figure 6); more over "It's interesting to note that this data seems to be sent always 22.5 kHz lower than the ALE slots. So far noticed on: 8000.7 USB (8023.2 - 22.5kHz), 18275.7 USB (18298.2 - 22.5kHz), 19825.7 USB (19848.2 - 22.5kHz)" linkz write.
 
Fig. 6 - Direction Finding tests results (thanks to linkz)

https://disk.yandex.com/d/LcwmPMweeu6C0A
 

25 June 2024

MS-110D App.D (WBHF) transmissions, Collins Aerospace over-the-air testing?

Wideband transmission heard a few days ago on 19829.0 KHz (cf) around 1713Z, the recording was kindly sent to me by my friend linkz who also performed - successfully - the Direction Finding attempts (see below).
As from Figure 1, the signal occupies a 6 KHz bandwidth and is modulated using PSK8 at the symbol rate of 4800 Baud. Given that the subcarrier is about 6000 Hz, and it shall be 3300 Hz (300 + 1/2 BW, as usual), the signal should be -2700 Hz shifted (the tuning frequency should be around 19826.0 KHz/USB). 

Fig. 1 - signal parameters

The ACF value and its framing are quite interesting: as can be seen in Figure 2, the autocorrelation plot shows pronounced spykes at 892.4 ms (4284 symbols/12852 bits) due to the existence of a sort of "superframe" consisting of seven frames marked by less evident spikes. The latter have a value of 127.5 ms (612 symbols/1836 bits) consisting of 544 symbols of unknown data followed by 68 (known) channel mini-probe symbols.

Fig. 2 - 127.5 ms & 849.4 ms ACFs

From the above results (bandwidth, modulation and framing) the signal belongs to MIL-STD 110D Appendix D (WBHF, WideBandHF), more precisely the Waveform Number 7: this appendix is a non-mandatory part of MIL-STD-188-110C; however, when data is to be communicated in single contiguous HF radio bandwidths greater than 3 kHz, up to 48 kHz, the waveforms employed shall be in accordance with this appendix. The PSK8 demodulated bitstream is shown in Figure 3.

Fig. 3 - bitstream after PSK8 demodulation

It is worth noting (and verify) some features of this waveform.
As per Table D-XXI the mini-probes consists of a 36 symbol "base sequence" cyclically extended to the required length: in our case, 68 symbols. W/out going into the merits of the mini-probes formation, some resulting mini-probes are shown in Figure 4.


Fig. 4 - 68 symbols mini-probes

In the zoomed bitstream in Figure 5, a characteristic pattern of the mini-probes is seen at intervals of 64 frames: this is because the mini-probes are also utilized to identify the long interleaver block boundary. Indeed, in our case the block length is just 64 frames. The boundary marker is accomplished by tansmitting a cyclically rotated version of the mini-probe (#D.5.2.2).

Fig. 5 - interleaver block boundary

Figure 6 shows the mini-probe marking the long interleaver block boundary: in accordance with Table D-XXI, the mini-probe is formed of the 36 symbols base sequence after 18 cyclic rotations.

Fig. 6
 
As shown in Figure 7, the data block is formed of groups of seven 544 symbol frames (7×544 data symbols) each group consisting of the same data, regardless of the scrambler since the scrambling sequence generator polynomial (x^9 +x^4 +1) is initialized to 00000001 at the start of each data frame (the 511 bits length scrambling sequence is repeated just slightly more than 3 times). The repetitions of these seven groups cause what I designed as "superframe" (see Figure 2) which indeed has a 892.49 ms ACF, corresponding to 7 frames (7×127.5 ms).  Based on the above, it can be said that 127.5 ms is the ACF value of frames and 892.4 is the ACF value of data symbols.
Investigating the nature of these bits does not make much sense since they are actually demodulated "symbols", i.e. data bits after having passed through the modulation chain (FEC encoder, interleaver, Gray decoder, scrambler). The repetitions could suggest a test transmission, but that's just my guess.
 
Fig. 7 - the 7-frame groups that form the data block and that cause the 892.4 ms ACF

As said above, my friend linkz did a great Direction Finding job and pinpointed Oxford Junction (IA) as Tx site location (see Figure 8 below).

Fig. 8 - DF runs (TDoA algorithm), thanks to linkz

The Oxford Junction transmitter site was operated by Rockwell Collins (now part of Collins Aerospace): a paper that they presented at HFIA Meeting in San Diego (February 4, 2010) just confirms the assumption and also shows an aerial photo of the HF station (Figure 9), notice that both EarthExplorer and Google Earth obscured that site.

Fig. 9

Since the Tx location, probably the heard transmissions are WBHF over-the-air test by Collins Aerospace... but that's another guess.

https://disk.yandex.com/d/oj5V4VHl6zb9Gg 

https://www.dropbox.com/scl/fi/4hc6eszz6xvo689b2ah5o/...